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ABSTRACT 
 
Globalization and Labor Market Outcomes: 
Wage Bargaining, Search Frictions, and Firm Heterogeneity*
 
We introduce search unemployment à la Pissarides into Melitz’ (2003) model of trade with 
heterogeneous firms. We allow wages to be individually or collectively bargained and 
analytically solve for the equilibrium. We find that the selection effect of trade influences labor 
market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long 
as it improves aggregate productivity net of transport costs. We show that this condition is 
likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or the entry of new trading countries. 
On the other hand, the gains from a reduction in fixed market access costs are more elusive. 
Calibrating the model shows that the positive impact of trade openness on employment is 
significant when wages are bargained at the individual level but much smaller when wages 
are bargained at the collective level. 
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1 Introduction
Public opinion meets globalization with mixed feelings. People agree that consumers benefit
from trade but they are at the same time deeply concerned by its impact on job security. Fueled
by numerous headlines about layoffs and outsourcing, many fear that globalization will worsen
their prospects on the labor market.1 To a certain extent, economic theory can rationalize this
fear. Workers who lose their jobs due to trade liberalization have to go through a period of
active search before finding new employment opportunities. During this period of transition,
job reallocations increase the amount of frictions in the labor market which mechanically pushes
up the rate of unemployment. On the other hand, comparatively little is known about the
long-run effect of trade liberalization on unemployment. This is largely because equilibrium
theories of trade and labor are still poorly integrated. In this paper, we attempt to bridge the
two literatures by proposing a framework which combines the currently dominant approaches in
each field.
We integrate a slightly generalized version of Melitz’s (2003) trade model with Pissarides’
(2000) canonical model of equilibrium unemployment. Building on Hopenhayn (1992) and Krug-
man (1980), the Melitz-model shows how trade liberalization affects the productivity distribution
of firms through selection of efficient firms into exporting and of inefficient firms into exit. That
selection effect enjoys massive empirical support2 and constitutes a tangible source of gains from
trade that the earlier literature has paid little attention to. Our analysis suggests that it also
matters for labor market outcomes. We find that, for reasonable parameter values, the cleans-
ing effect of trade lowers search unemployment. As the cost of vacancy posting relative to the
productivity of the average firm decreases, employers intensify their recruitment efforts. This
raises the ratio of job vacancies to unemployed workers, which leads to lower unemployment and
higher real wages.
Our framework generalizes Melitz’s and Pissarides’ set-ups as follows. First, we allow for a
flexible parameterization of the external scale effect through which input diversity affects ag-
gregate productivity. This helps to disentangle the selection effect from the diversity-enhancing
effect of trade modeled by Krugman (1980). It also addresses recent empirical evidence by Arde-
lean (2007) which puts the strength of the scale effect at a level substantially lower than the one
implicitly assumed in the literature.3 We also need to adapt the search-matching framework,
1Scheve and Slaughter (2001) provide a detailed analysis of how American workers perceive globalization.
2See, among others, the surveys by Helpman (2006) or Bernard et al. (2007).
3 Recent work by Corsetti et al. (2007) stresses the importance of external scale economies in a homogeneous-
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which builds on competitive product markets, to make it compatible with the assumption of
monopolistic competition used in trade models of the Krugman (1980) tradition. Allowing for
monopoly power on product markets implies that we have to abandon matches as our unit of
analysis and consider instead multiple-worker firms. Given the existence of search frictions, this
introduces the complication of intra-firm bargaining. We analyze two environments: individual
bargaining, where each worker is treated as the marginal worker and which is closest to com-
petitive wage setting; and collective bargaining, where management bargains about wages and
employment with firm-level unions.
Although the model features firms with heterogeneous productivity, monopoly power on
product markets, external economies of scale, and, due to search frictions, monopsony power
on labor markets, we are able to characterize its equilibrium in closed-form. The aggregation
procedure proposed by Melitz goes through with little modification because, regardless of the
bargaining environment, firms with different productivity levels pay similar wages. We also ob-
tain a useful separability result according to which the equilibrium average productivity of input
producers is independent from labor market outcomes. Accordingly, the system of equilibrium
conditions turns out to be recursive. One can follow the same steps than Melitz (2003) to com-
pute the average productivity in the economy and then solve for the equilibrium in the labor
market.
In the absence of scale economies, the labor market equilibrium can be derived as in the stan-
dard Mortensen-Pissarides model by interacting a job creation and a wage curve. Then, whether
trade liberalization improves or worsens labor market outcomes depends solely on how it affects
average productivity. Even though trade liberalization reallocates market shares towards effi-
cient firms, exporters also incur transport costs that have to be deducted from the productivity
gains. This is why trade liberalization does not necessarily enhance average productivity. We
establish that both average productivity and employment always increase following a reduction
in variable trade costs or an increase in the number of trade partners, as long as fixed foreign
distribution costs are larger than domestic ones. Given that this requirement is satisfied by
realistic calibrations of the model, such liberalization policies are likely to improve labor market
outcomes. The gains of reducing fixed costs for foreign firms turn out to be more elusive because
such a change benefits almost exclusively to new exporters.
Introducing external economies of scale drives a wedge between average and aggregate pro-
ductivity. It complicates the analysis as we also have to take into account the positive rela-
firms, open macro model.
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tionship between input diversity and aggregate productivity. This new effect gives rise to an
additional equilibrium relation and restricts the parameter space where the model admits a
unique equilibrium. Setting aside these technical results, we find that scale economies do not
modify the qualitative implications of the model. They actually reinforce the positive impact of
trade liberalization by adding the variety-enhancing effect described in Krugman (1980) to the
selection effect.
We conclude our analysis by a calibration exercise. Simulating various trade liberalization
scenarios allows us to to sort out the ambiguities, in particular regarding the role of fixed foreign
costs, and to assess the magnitude of the effects. The simulations predict that reducing variable
trade costs, or increasing the number of trade partners, has a significantly positive impact
on both wages and employment. The labor market effects of trade liberalization are strongly
conditioned by the nature of the wage bargaining environment. When wages are negotiated
collectively rather then individually, trade reform yields substantially lower unemployment gains,
with aggregate productivity gains almost entirely absorbed by rising real wages. Moreover,
results are sensitive with respect to the size of external scale economies; this calls for more
empirical research into the parameters governing the model.
Related literature. This paper builds on our earlier work (Felbermayr and Prat, 2007) where
we introduce search unemployment into a closed economy version of Melitz (2003) with the
aim to study product market regulation. The relation to the present paper is straightforward,
since trade liberalization can be understood as an alternative type of product market reform.
In modeling bargaining regimes, we draw on Ebell and Haefke (2006), who analyze a closed-
economy, homogeneous firms model of search and unemployment.
There is a growing number of theory papers on the trade-unemployment relationship with
heterogeneous firms. Our approach is closely related to the recent work of Egger and Kreick-
emeier (2007), who study the effect of trade liberalization in a model with fair wages. They
find that trade increases the wage dispersion among identical workers and also leads to more
unemployment. Davis and Harrigan (2007) find similar results for the degree of wage dispersion
and unemployment, using an efficiency wages approach instead of fair wages.
There is a small but important literature on search unemployment in Heckscher-Ohlin trade
models which goes back to Davidson et al. (1988). Building on this seminal line of research,
three recent papers also discuss search unemployment in trade models with heterogeneous firms.
The model closest to ours is presented by Janiak (2006). His framework exhibits an equilibrium
3
under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is smaller than two. As explained below,
this restriction explains why Janiak’s model predicts that trade liberalization raises equilibrium
unemployment. In our model, equilibrium existence and uniqueness is guaranteed under less
restrictive and more plausible conditions.
Mitra and Ranjan (2007) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2007) introduce search unemployment
in two-sector models with heterogeneous firms. Their papers differ from ours in terms of mo-
tivation and setup: Mitra and Ranjan discuss the role of off-shoring; Helpman and Itskhoki
focus on how labor market distortions diffuse internationally through trade. In contrast to our
paper, Helpman and Itskhoki deviate from the standard search-and-matching framework as they
disallow for forward-looking behavior of workers and firms on the labor market. Moreover, the
symmetric version of their model (which is most easily comparable to our setup) features a neg-
ative trade-unemployment link: trade boosts average productivity in the differentiated goods
sector, making employment there more attractive. This leads to a reallocation of labor from the
distortion-free nume´raire sector into the friction-ridden differentiated goods sector.4
Structure of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
lays-out the set-up of the model. In section 3, we analyze two ways of endogenizing wages:
individual bargaining and efficient collective bargaining. In section 4, we describe exit and entry
of firms. Section 5 studies the effects of three globalization scenarios: (i) a reduction in variable
trade costs, (ii) an increase in the number of trade relations, (iii) a reduction in fixed exporting
costs. Section 6 calibrates the model in order to quantify the magnitude of the effects. Section
7 concludes. Proofs of the propositions, lemmata and corollaries are included in the Appendix.
2 Setup of the Model
We consider an economy that is essentially similar to the one analyzed in Melitz (2003) but
for the existence of search frictions in the labor market. As in Melitz, the world is modeled
as a collection of symmetric countries which interact on product markets.5 We deviate from
existing treatments by explicitly parameterizing the external effect of increased input diversity
on aggregate productivity.
4Davidson et al. (2007) propose a model with two-sided heterogeneity, where goods markets are perfectly
competitive and firms endogenously choose technologies.
5For brevity, we skip the special case of autarky. Due to symmetry, we do not use country indices.
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Final output producers. The setup of the production side of our model is akin to Egger and
Kreickemeier (2007). The single final output good, Y, is produced under conditions of perfect
competition and can be either consumed or used as an input in the production process. Good
Y is assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs, which may be produced domestically
or imported, and which may command different equilibrium prices. Denoting the quantity of
such an input q (ω), we posit the following production function
Y =
[
M
ν−1
σ
∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, ν ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where the measure of the set Ω is the mass M of available intermediate inputs, each produced
by a monopolistically competitive firm. We refer to M as the degree of input diversity while σ
denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of inputs.
To understand the role played by ν, suppose that all varieties are demanded in identical
quantities. Substituting q (ω) = Q/M , where Q is an aggregate index of input demand, yields
Y = M
ν
σ−1Q. If ν = 0, then Y = Q and the number of available varieties is irrelevant for total
output. This is the case discussed by Giavazzi and Blanchard (2003) or Egger and Kreickemeier
(2007).6 If ν = 1, the production function takes the conventional Dixit-Stiglitz form, where an
increased number of varieties increases total output.
Specification (1) offers at least three advantages. First, the recent estimates of Ardelean
(2007) indicate that ν ∈ (0, 1) . Hence, the conventional formulation where ν = 1 tends to
exaggerate the role of diversity for aggregate productivity. Second, if ν > 0, the autarky version
of our model yields a counterfactual negative correlation between the unemployment rate and the
labor supply. With trade and symmetric countries, this counterfactual implication is maintained
on the world level.7 We nonetheless allow for ν > 0 to accommodate the dominant practice in
the trade literature where gains from increased diversity are generally deemed important. Third,
equation (1) with ν = 1 yields the cases discussed by Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003) and thus
allows us to address the importance of this assumption for their results.
The price index dual to (1) is P =
[
Mν−1
∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ)
, where p (ω) is the price
6Our formulation of the aggregate production is formally similar to the utility function employed by Corsetti,
Martin, and Pesenti (2007) who also stress the role of ν. Egger and Kreickemeier (2007) allow for ν ∈ [0, 1] in
the appendix of their paper. Benassy (1996) discusses how the welfare properties of the Krugman (1980) model
depend on ν. In particular, if ν 6= 1, the decentralized equilibrium may yield over- or under-supply of input variety.
This discussion carries over to the Melitz (2003) model.
7With heterogeneous countries and costly trade, larger countries suffer less from trade costs, have a higher
level of aggregate productivity, and a lower rate of unemployment.
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of input ω, inclusive of potential trade costs. We choose the final output good as the nume´raire,
i.e. P = 1. Then the demand of intermediate inputs ω reads
q(ω) =
Y
M1−ν
p(ω)−σ. (2)
Intermediate input producers. At the intermediate inputs level, there is a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms which produce each a unique variety. Labor is the unique fac-
tor of production. It is inelastically supplied by the household and enters firms’ production func-
tions linearly. Firms have different productivity levels ϕ (ω), so that output q (ω) = l (ω)ϕ (ω).
In the following, we use ϕ to index intermediate input producers.
On the domestic and on each of the n symmetric export markets, input producers face
fixed market access costs (e.g., distribution costs), fD and fX respectively.8 We assume that
τσ−1fX > fD. As explained below, this ensures that only a subset of firms export and that
exporters are on average more efficient than non-exporting firms.
International trade is subject to the traditional variable iceberg trade costs τ ≥ 1. In order
to deliver a unit of input to a foreign market, the firm has to manufacture τ units. If it decides
to serve both the domestic and the foreign markets, a firm allocates its output so as to maximize
its total revenues. Operating revenues from sales on a given foreign market are therefore equal
to pXqX/τ .9 By symmetry, demands on the domestic and foreign markets are given by equation
(2). Equating marginal revenues across markets therefore yields pX(ϕ) = τpD(ϕ) and qX(ϕ) =
τ1−σqD(ϕ), where D and X denote the domestic and the export market. Hence, total revenues
are given by
R(l;ϕ) ≡
[
Y
M1−ν
(
1 + I(ϕ)nτ1−σ
)]1/σ
(ϕl)
σ−1
σ , (3)
with I(ϕ) being an indicator function that takes value one when a ϕ-firm exports and zero
otherwise. Apart from the fact that their effective demand level is multiplied by 1 + nτ1−σ,
exporting firms have similar revenue functions than non-exporting firms.
In order to facilitate the aggregation procedure, we define the average productivity level ϕ˜
such that qD (ϕ˜) = Y/M
ν
σ−1+1. In the benchmark case where there are no externalities of scale,
so that ν = 0, the domestic sales qD (ϕ˜) of the average firm is equal to the average sales per firm
8Since capital markets are perfect and uncertainty is resolved before market access costs are paid, fX and
fD can be thought as flow fixed costs or – appropriately discounted – as upfront investment. In the latter case,
whenever applicable, we use upper-case letters.
9Notice that pX is the c.i.f. price in the foreign market.
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Y/M , and the domestic price of its good pD (ϕ˜) = P = 1.
Search frictions. The labor market is imperfectly competitive due to the existence of search
frictions. Whereas marginal recruitment costs are increasing at the aggregate level because of
congestion externalities, they are exogenous from a firm’s point of view. The aggregate matching
function is homogeneous of degree one so that the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ uniquely
determines the rate m (θ) at which firms fill their vacancies. That rate is a decreasing function
of θ and satisfies the following standard properties: limθ→∞m(θ) = 0 and limθ→0m(θ) = ∞.
Due to the linear homogeneity of the matching function, job seekers meet firms at the rate θm (θ)
which is increasing in θ. The cost of posting vacancies is proportional to the parameter c, so
that recruiting l workers entails spending [c/m(θ)] l. In other words, firms face an adjustment
cost function that is linear in labor.
3 Labor Market Equilibrium
This section characterizes the labor market equilibrium for two common models of wage de-
termination, individual and collective bargaining. We establish that, in both cases, wages are
constant across firms and the vacancy-unemployment ratio is increasing in aggregate productiv-
ity. In the subsequent analysis, we will index endogenous variables by the subscript I or C to
indicate individual or collective bargaining.10
We devise our model in discrete time. All payments are made at the end of each period.
Before the beginning of the next period, firms and workers are hit by idiosyncratic shocks: (i)
with probability δ, intermediate producers are forced to leave the market; (ii) with probability
χ, each job is destroyed because of match-specific shocks. We assume that these two shocks are
independent so that s = δ + χ− δχ denotes the actual rate of job separation.
Unemployed workers earn a flow income of bΦ, where Φ ≡ M νσ−1 ϕ˜ measures aggregate
productivity (while–with some abuse of wording–we refer to ϕ˜ as average productivity). Indexing
the value of non-market activity to Φ is consistent with the empirically relevant case where
unemployment benefits are proportional to aggregate productivity.11 In any case, when ν = 0,
setting the flow value of non-market activity equal to an exogenous constant does not affect
10We drop these indices when there is no risk of confusion.
11Directly indexing the value of non-market activity to wages, i.e. assuming that unemployed workers earn a
flow income equal to bw with b < 1, yields similar results but slightly complicates the algebra.
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our main insights. On the other hand, when there are economies of scales (ν > 0), it leads to
multiple equilibria while our normalization ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium.
3.1 Individual wage bargaining
Individual wage bargaining involves the following sequence of actions: at each period, the inter-
mediate input producer decides about the optimal number of vacancies vI , taking the wage rate
as given. The matching technology brings together the workers and the firm. Before production
takes place, wages are bargained. Wage contracts are unenforceable: at any point in time, the
firm may fire any employee and symmetrically any employee may quit. Solving the game by
backward induction, we first characterize the firm’s optimal vacancy setting behavior, and then
solve the bargaining problem.
The market value of an intermediate producer solves
JI (lI ;ϕ) = max
vI
1
1 + r
{
R(lI ;ϕ)− wI (lI ;ϕ) lI − cvI − fD − I(ϕ)nfX + (1− δ)JI
(
l′I ;ϕ
)}
, (4)
s.t. (i) R(lI ;ϕ) =
[
Y
Mν−1
(
1 + I(ϕ)nτ1−σ
)]1/σ
(ϕlI)
σ−1
σ ,
(ii) l′I = (1− χ)lI +m (θI) vI ,
where l′I is the level of employment next period, and the dependence of lI , vI and qI on ϕ
is understood. Constraint (i) is the revenue function (3) and (ii) gives the law of motion of
employment at the firm level. The first order condition for vacancy posting reads
c
m(θI)
= (1− δ)∂JI(l
′
I , ϕ)
∂l′I
, (5)
so that the firm sets the shadow value of labor equal to the marginal recruitment cost. Substi-
tuting the constraints into the objective function of the firm, differentiating with respect to lI ,
and using the optimality condition (5) yields
∂JI(lI , ϕ)
∂lI
=
1
1 + r
[
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
− wI(lI , ϕ)− ∂wI(lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI +
c
m(θI)
(1− χ)
]
. (6)
The firm acts as a monopsonist by taking into account the effect of additional employment on
the wage of inframarginal employees. Replacing the first order condition (5) on the left-hand
side of (6), we obtain an expression that implicitly determines the optimal pricing behavior of
the monopolist
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
= wI(lI , ϕ) +
∂wI(lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI +
c
m (θI)
(
r + s
1− δ
)
. (7)
8
This expression differs from Melitz (2003) in that marginal costs are augmented by a monopsony
effect and expected recruitment costs.
The total surplus accruing from a successful match is split between the employee and the firm.
The worker’s surplus is equal to the difference between the value of being employed EI (l;ϕ)
by a firm with productivity ϕ and workforce l and the value of being unemployed UI . The
firm’s surplus is simply equal to the marginal increase in the firm’s value ∂JI (l;ϕ) /∂lI because
individual bargaining implies that each employee is treated as the marginal worker. Following
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) we assume that the outcome of bargaining over the division of the
total surplus from the match satisfies the following “surplus-splitting” rule
(1− β) [EI (l;ϕ)− UI ] = β∂JI (l;ϕ)
∂lI
, (8)
where the parameter β measures the bargaining power of the worker and thus belongs to (0, 1).
As explained by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), condition (8) can be micro-founded either by
cooperative or non-cooperative game theory. In the non-cooperative case, condition (8) charac-
terizes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive form game where the firm and
its employees play a bargaining game of Binmore et al. (1986) within each bargaining session.
Accordingly, neither the firm nor any employee can improve their positions by renegotiating.
In the cooperative case, condition (8) assigns to each party its Shapley value, that is the av-
erage, over all possible permutations, of each player contribution to possible coalitions ordered
below him.12 When β differs from 1/2, condition (8) generalizes the symmetric Shapley value
to situations where players are not treated identically.
Using the shadow value of labor (6) in the bargaining solution (8), we obtain a differential
equation in the wage rate, which can be solved to give rise to a Wage curve (WI). The equilib-
rium wage and labor market tightness are found by interacting WI with a Job Creation curve
(JCI), as in standard search-matching models.
Proposition 1 When wages are bargained at the individual level, the labor market admits an
equilibrium if and only if b < σ−1σ−β . The equilibrium is unique and such that wages are constant
across firms. The equilibrium wage, wI , and vacancy-unemployment ratio, θI , simultaneously
12This interpretation is the one favored by Helpman and Itskhoki (2007).
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satisfy the following Wage and Job Creation conditions:
WI : wI = bΦ+
β
1− β
(
c
m(θI)
(
r + s
1− δ
))
+
β
1− β
cθI
1− δ (9)
JCI : wI =
(
σ − 1
σ − β
)
Φ− c
m(θI)
(
r + s
1− δ
)
(10)
The Job Creation curve characterizes firms’ optimal recruitment efforts which are, as ex-
pected, decreasing in the wage level. The Wage curve implies that wages depend only on
aggregate productivity so that workers are paid similarly across firms with different productivity
levels. This somewhat surprising result extends to a dynamic setting the proof of Stole and
Zwiebel (1996) that firms exploit their monopsony power until employees are paid their outside
option. In our case, the outside option is augmented by the recruitment costs that the firm
would have to pay if it were to replace the worker. Quite intuitively, the workers’ bargaining
position is improving in the severity of labor market frictions which explains why the Wage
curve is increasing in θ.
The existence condition in Proposition 1 states that the flow value of non-market activity
should not yield revenues in excess of a share (σ − 1)/(σ − β) of aggregate productivity. For
values of σ above 2 and bargaining power β close or below 1/2, as commonly assumed in the
literature, this implies that the flow value of non-market activity is no larger than 2/3 aggregate
productivity; this is a rather undemanding requirement.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of an increase in aggregate productivity Φ on labor market
tightness. The Job Creation curve shifts upwards (from the solid to the dashed curve) because
firms are on average more productive and search more intensively for workers. The intercept
of the Wage curve also increases because unemployment benefits are proportional to aggregate
productivity. However, this second effect is dominated because the flow value of non-market
activity is only equal to a share b < 1 of market productivity.13 Hence labor market tightness
goes from θ0I to θ
1
I . Trade liberalization will affect labor market outcomes to the extent that
it changes aggregate productivity Φ by modifying the degree of input diversity M and/or the
average productivity of input producers ϕ˜.
Corollary 1 When wages are bargained at the individual level, the vacancy-unemployment ratio
θI is increasing in aggregate productivity Φ.
13When the flow value of non-market activity is simply set equal to an exogenous constant, the Wage curve is
not affected by a change in ΦI . Then the result in Corollary 1 follows immediately.
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Figure 1: Effect of an increasing ΦI in the Individual Bargaining regime.
3.2 Collective bargaining
In a firm covered by collective bargaining, workers form a firm-wide coalition, that is, a trade
union. When bargaining fails and workers go on strike, the firm loses not only the value associ-
ated to the marginal worker, as with individual bargaining, but its entire labor force. We opt
for an efficient bargaining setup so that the firm and the union bargain about both wages and
employment. This ensures that we are considering equilibria lying on the Pareto frontier.14
Negotiations between the union and the firm take place in the first period.15 The union’s
objective is the expected sum of its members’ rents
U(l, w) ≡ (1− δ)l
[
w − rU
r + δ
]
,
14Our main results also hold in a right to manage set-up where unions negotiate only about wages and firms
have full freedom to set the level of employment. Barth and Zweimu¨ller (1995) study different wage bargaining
scenarios when firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity.
15One could instead consider that the firm and the union bargain on the steady-state profits, so that F(l, w;ϕ) =(
1−δ
r+δ
) [
R (l;ϕ)− wl(ϕ)− c
m(θ)
χl(ϕ)
]
. This obviously generates a hold-up problem where the union does not take
into account the initial recruitment costs. Then employment is lower and wages higher but the main insights of
this section are not fundamentally modified.
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while the firm seeks to maximize its expected variable profits
F(l, w;ϕ) ≡
(
1− δ
r + δ
)[
R (l;ϕ)− wl(ϕ)− c
m (θ)
χl(ϕ)
]
− c
m(θC)
l .
The negotiation specifies both employment and wages. The solution lies on the contract curve
which connects the points where the firm iso-profit curves are tangent to the union indifference
curves. The actual agreement is pinned down by the union’s bargaining power β. Proposition
2 shows that the labor market equilibrium can be characterized in a similar fashion than in the
Individual Bargaining regime.
Proposition 2 When wages are collectively bargained, the labor market admits an equilibrium
if and only if b < (σ − 1) /σ. The equilibrium is unique and such that wages are constant across
firms. The equilibrium wage, wC , and vacancy-unemployment ratio, θC , simultaneously satisfy
the following Wage and Job Creation conditions:
WC : wC = bΦ+
β
σ
(
θCm(θC)
r + s
)
Φ+
β
σ
Φ (11)
JCC : wC =
(
1− 1− β
σ
)
Φ− c
m (θC)
(
r + s
1− δ
)
(12)
For the same reasons than before, the Wage curve is increasing in θ while the Job Creation
curve is decreasing. The bargained wage is equal to the opportunity cost of employment rUC
plus a share β of the remaining profits per worker. Due to the existence of rent-sharing, and
in contrast to individual bargaining, the slope of the Wage curve is increasing in aggregate
productivity. Yet, as with individual bargaining, the wage rate is the same across firms with
different levels of productivity. Figure 2 illustrates why, in our CES setting, differences in
idiosyncratic productivity wash out so that there is no wage dispersion.
First consider the curves without dot. The plain curve plots the average revenues per worker
while the dashed curve plots the marginal revenues. The competitive outcome where β = 0 is
obviously given by the point where the marginal revenue function intersects the workers’ outside
option rUC . Starting from this point, the contract curve describes a vertical16 segment which
reaches the average revenue function. This upper-bound gives the outcome when workers have
all the bargaining power (β = 1) since then the firm’s profits net of fixed costs are zero. When β
varies between 0 and 1, wages fluctuate between these two extremes. Now consider the problem
16As usual, the verticality of the contract curve follows from the risk neutrality of workers. Introducing risk
aversion yields a contract curve with a positive but bounded slope.
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Figure 2: Collective bargaining with ϕ0 < ϕ1.
of a firm with a higher productivity ϕ1 > ϕ0. As shown by the dotted curves, the only difference
is that both average and marginal revenues functions are shifted to the right. Furthermore, since
firms apply the same mark-up, the two curves are shifted parallely. Accordingly, firms with a
higher productivity hire more workers but pay the same wage.
The most significant difference with the individual bargaining regime is that now aggregate
productivity Φ also raises the slope of the Wage curve. Yet, as stated in Corollary 2, this
additional effect on the Wage curve is again unambiguously dominated by the shift of the Job
Creation curve.
Corollary 2 When wages are collectively bargained, the vacancy-unemployment ratio θC is in-
creasing in aggregate productivity Φ.
We would like to acknowledge an important caveat before closing our characterization of the
labor market: if search costs c were measured in units of labor, then increasing Φ would raise
the real wage but leave the labor market tightness unchanged.17 This illustrates that changes
17Similarly, if c were indexed to aggregate productivity (e.g. c = Φc¯, with c¯ > 0) the equilibrium value of θ
13
in employment are driven by the negative effect of aggregate productivity on real vacancy costs.
For two reasons we stick to the assumption that vacancy costs are measured in units of the final
output good. First, as soon as search costs depend on the price of the final output good (e.g.
c = wc¯+ c , with {c¯, c} ⊂ R2+), variations in Φ do affect θ so that Corollaries 1 and 2 continue to
hold. Second, it is not clear how to model wage bargaining when the cost of a vacancy is itself
subject to negotiation, as it would be the case if the production of search services were to draw
on labor. We therefore stick to the conventional practice and assume that the search process
does not directly require the use of labor.18
In this section, we have described how to solve for the labor market equilibrium. Our two
equilibrium conditions take the average productivity, ϕ˜, and the equilibrium diversity of inputs,
M , as given. Changes in these two variables affect aggregate productivity Φ, thereby moving
the Job Creation and Wage curves. To the extent that Φ goes up, the rate of unemployment
falls and the real wage rises, regardless of the bargaining regime. The next section explains how
to endogenize average productivity.
4 Firm Entry and Exit
We model firm entry and exit in a similar fashion than Melitz (2003), which in turn draws on
the seminal work by Hopenhayn (1992). We deliberately keep the analysis as brief as possible
and refer the reader to Melitz’ paper for further details. Our contribution is to show that the
equilibrium level of average productivity ϕ˜ and the labor market tightness θ are independent
(hence we drop subindices {I, C} from the outset).
The entry process is in two stages. First, prospective entrants pay an entry cost FE . Only
after entering are they able to draw their productivity from a sampling distribution with c.d.f.
G (ϕ) and p.d.f. g (ϕ). After the draw, productivities remain constant over time.19 Given
that firms’ revenues are increasing in ϕ, one can define a threshold ϕ∗D below which firms
do not take up production. Similarly, firms with a productivity level between ϕ∗D and ϕ
∗
X
will serve only their domestic market. The share of exporting firms is therefore equal to % ≡
[1−G (ϕ∗X)] / [1−G (ϕ∗D)]. The average level of productivity of intermediate input producers
would be independent from Φ.
18Note that, if aggregate TFP were trending, our model would always exhibit a balanced growth path, regardless
of whether we index c to Φ, w or to the final output good.
19This stylized assumption is made mainly for tractability reasons. It is the key difference between Melitz’s
(2003) and Hopenhayn’s (1992) models, as the latter also allows firms’ productivities to vary over time.
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is given by the following weighted sum
ϕ˜ =
{
1
1 + n%
[
ϕ˜σ−1D + n%
(
ϕ˜X
τ
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
, (13)
where ϕ˜D and ϕ˜X are average productivity indices for the populations of firms that sell only
domestically and that also sell abroad
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗D) =
∫ +∞ϕ∗D ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
1−G (ϕ∗D)

1
σ−1
and ϕ˜ (ϕ∗X) =
∫ +∞ϕ∗X ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
1−G (ϕ∗X)

1
σ−1
. (14)
Let us first characterize the entry threshold ϕ∗D. The linearity of the adjustment cost function
implies that firms reach their optimal size by the end of their first period of activity.20 It is
profitable to start operating and to recruit workers when
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− r− δ)tpiD (ϕ)− c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ)− fD = (1− δ)piD (ϕ)
r + δ
− c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ)− fD ≥ 0 , (15)
where
piD (ϕ) = pD(ϕ)ϕlD(ϕ)− wlD(ϕ)− c
m (θ)
χlD(ϕ)− fD
is the optimal flow profit from domestic sales of a ϕ-firm. Condition (15) accounts for the fact
that firms pay market access and vacancy costs up front but have to wait one period to recruit
their workers. In this period, they can be hit by a destruction shock, so that, with probability
δ, they never start producing. The cut-off productivity ϕ∗D is such that the weak inequality in
(15) binds. The proportionality of domestic prices allows us to relate operating profits of the
marginal and average firm
piD (ϕ˜D) + fD
piD
(
ϕ∗D
)
+ fD
=
lD (ϕ˜D)
lD
(
ϕ∗D
) = ( ϕ˜D
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
.
Hence, (15) is equivalent to the following Zero Cutoff Profit condition
piD (ϕ˜D) =
(
r + δ
1− δ
)[
c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ˜D)
]
+ fD
[(
ϕ˜D
ϕ∗D
)σ−1(1 + r
1− δ
)
− 1
]
. (16)
20Gradual convergence can be restored either by considering that recruitment costs are convex in the number
of posted vacancies, as in Bertola and Caballero (1994), or by assuming that firms can post only one vacancy,
as in Acemoglu and Hawkins (2007). Since this greatly complicates the aggregation procedure, we adopt a more
parsimonious specification where, as in Melitz (2003), firms jump to their optimal size. See Koeniger and Prat
(2007) for a numerical analysis of a model with firm entry and convex adjustment costs.
15
The choice of exporting status can be characterized in a similar fashion. One simply has to
replace the subscripts D in equation (15) by X and to update the definition of profits as follows
piX (ϕ) = pX(ϕ)ϕlX(ϕ)/τ − wlX(ϕ)− c
m (θ)
χlX(ϕ)− fX .
Given that export prices are also proportional to productivity, we obtain a similar Zero Cutoff
Profit (ZCP) condition for exporting firms
piX (ϕ˜X) =
(
r + δ
1− δ
)[
c
m (θ)
lX (ϕ˜X)
]
+ fX
[(
ϕ˜X
ϕ∗X
)σ−1(1 + r
1− δ
)
− 1
]
. (17)
To see that some firms serve solely their domestic market, notice that RX(ϕ) = pX(ϕ)qX(ϕ)/τ =
τ1−σRD(ϕ) and lX(ϕ) = τ1−σlD(ϕ). Accordingly, the flow profits satisfy piX(ϕ) = τ1−σ[piD(ϕ)+
fD]− fX . Replacing this expression in (15) illustrates that a ϕ∗D-firm does not find it profitable
to incur the exporting costs when, as assumed in Section 2, τσ−1fX > fD.21
The ZCP conditions characterize the optimal decision of a firm who knows its idiosyncratic
productivity. Free Entry (FE) allows us to take into account the behavior of prospective entrants.
Entry occurs until expected profits are equal to the entry cost FE , so that
FE
1−G(ϕ∗D)
=
piD(ϕ˜D)
r + δ
(1− δ)− c
m(θ)
lD(ϕ˜D)−fD+n%
[
piX(ϕ˜X)
r + δ
(1− δ)− c
m(θ)
lX(ϕ˜X)− fX
]
.
(18)
Free entry holds when this equality is satisfied because an entrant will start to operate with
probability 1 − G(ϕ∗D). On the domestic market, successful entrants earn an average expected
stream of profits equal to equation (15) as evaluated for the representative firm ϕ˜D. Moreover,
entrants will also export with probability 1 − G(ϕ∗X) = %[1 − G(ϕ∗D)] and earn the average
expected stream of profits on the export markets. Taking into account these two eventualities
leads to equation (18). Combining the FE and ZCP Conditions yields
FE = [1−G(ϕ∗D)]
(
1 + r
r + δ
){
fD
[(
ϕ˜(ϕ∗D)
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
+ n%fX
[(
ϕ˜(ϕ∗X)
ϕ∗X
)σ−1
− 1
]}
. (19)
Although (19) depends on both ϕ∗D and ϕ
∗
X , it actually pins down the two variables because
ϕ∗X = ϕ
∗
Dτ (fX/fD)
1
σ−1 .22 Given that our equilibrium condition is the same than in Melitz
21When this partitioning does not hold, one cannot use equation (15) to determine whether or not a firm
operates on the domestic market because it may be optimal to pay the fixed operating cost fX in order to access
the export markets.
22See the proof of Lemma 1 for a derivation of this equality.
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(2003), the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the product market are ensured. Most
interestingly, the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ drops out when the FE and ZCP Conditions are
interacted. This implies that, as stated in the following lemma, the entry and export thresholds
depend solely on the product market parameters {FE , fD, fX , n, τ, σ, r, δ} and the properties of
the c.d.f. G (ϕ).
Lemma 1 (Separability) Regardless of the bargaining regime, the equilibrium average produc-
tivity of intermediate producers, ϕ˜, does not depend on the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ or on
input diversity M.
In other words, labor market conditions do not influence the optimal partitioning of firms.
Note that this is a general feature of the Melitz (2003) framework when firms pay identical wages.
To understand this result, it is useful to remember that the FE and ZCP conditions relate the
average profit per firm to the cutoff productivity. Hence, they are not affected by the impact
on operating revenues of changes in labor market tightness and wages. Firms’ equilibrium sizes
adjust so as to offset any increase or decrease in revenues per worker until both product market
conditions are satisfied again.
Accordingly, the only relevant effect is the positive relationship between θ and the initial
recruitment costs, cl(ϕ)/m(θ), of newly created firms. On the one hand, higher recruitment
costs discourage potential entrants. For a given level of operating profits, free entry requires a
greater likelihood of entering the market, that is a lower cutoff productivity ϕ∗. On the other
hand, firms that have already paid the entry cost and have drawn their idiosyncratic productivity
find it less attractive to initiate production when recruitment costs are higher. This obviously
raises the cutoff productivity ϕ∗. Given that the expected recruitment costs before entry are
equal to the recruitment costs of the average firm, the ex-ante and ex-post effects of θ exactly
offset each other.23 Plotting, as Melitz (2003) does, the equilibrium conditions in the cutoff-
productivity / average-profit space yields the following adjustments: following an increase in θ,
both FE and ZCP loci shift up by the same amount so that the average profit per firm goes up,
but the cutoff productivity remains constant.
The separability property stated in Lemma 1 allows to solve for equilibrium in a recursive
way. Average productivity and cutoff productivities can be determined as in Melitz (2003) by
considering solely product market parameters. Taking these values as given, we can then solve
23This property hinges on the log-linearity of firm sizes with respect to ϕ. Hence, the independence of ϕ∗ on θ
clearly depends on the CES specification.
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for the equilibrium in the labor market. Note, however, that we still need to determine input
diversity M in order to derive aggregate productivity Φ. As shown in the next section, this last
step is trivial when there are no economies of scale but otherwise leads to the introduction of
an additional equilibrium condition.
5 Unemployment and Trade Liberalization
This section discusses three globalization scenarios: (i) a reduction of variable trade costs, (ii)
an increase in the number of trade relations and (iii) a drop in the fixed foreign distribution costs
fX . The first and the third scenario capture technological (transportation costs) and political
(tariffs, technical barriers to trade) change, while the second addresses the emergence of new
countries into the global trading system. We describe the interaction of trade liberalization and
unemployment in two steps. First, we consider the case where trade affects aggregate outcomes
through the selection effect only (ν = 0). This isolates the novel mechanism introduced by
Melitz (2003) and characterizes a particularly tractable special case. Then we analyze the more
intricate case where trade also affects outcomes through an external scale effect, as in Krugman
(1980) and in much of the subsequent literature.
5.1 The equilibrium rate of unemployment
The steady-state rate of unemployment is linked to the degree of labor market tightness θ and
the importance of labor market churning, as captured by s, via the standard Beveridge curve
u(θ) =
s
s+ θm (θ)
. (20)
This condition ensures that the flows in and out of the unemployment pool are equal. As in
standard search-matching models, the rate of unemployment is a decreasing function of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio. Since we have shown in Propositions 1 and 2 that θ is increasing
in the level of aggregate productivity, it is sufficient to know how trade affects Φ ≡ M νσ−1 ϕ˜ in
order to characterize its impact on employment.
As usual, the equilibrium mass of firms is such that the labor market clears. Given that all
workers are employed by domestic firms
MD [lD(ϕ˜D) + n%lX(ϕ˜X)] = [1− u(θ)]L , (21)
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where L is the size of the labor force and MD is the mass of domestic producers in each country.
Due to imports from foreign firms, input diversity M (i.e., the number of available varieties) is
higher and equal to M =MD (1 + n%).
Lemma 2 Equilibrium input diversity is determined by the Labor Market Clearing (LMC) con-
dition which is a function of labor market tightness θ and average productivity ϕ˜. For individual
bargaining, the LMC reads
LMCI :MI(θI) =
(1 + n%) (1− u(θI))L( 1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
r + s
) ϕ˜(
r+δ
1+r
)
FE
1−G(ϕ∗D) + fD + n%fX
 σ−1σ−1−ν .
(22)
For collective bargaining, the LMC is given by
LMCC :MC(θC) =
(1 + n%) (1− u(θC))L(1− β
σ
)(
1− δ
r + s
) ϕ˜(
r+δ
1+r
)
FE
1−G(ϕ∗D) + fD + n%fX
 σ−1σ−1−ν .
(23)
Surprisingly enough, the sign of the relationship between input diversity M and aggregate
employment is not always positive. This is because M has two opposite effects: (i) at the
aggregate level, a larger number of firms naturally increases the number of employees; (ii) at
the firm level, economies of scale implies that more input diversity raises revenues per worker
so that firms have to be smaller for the ZCP condition to be satisfied.
When ν = 0, the scale effect is ruled out and so M is always increasing in the level of
employment, as one might expect. On the other hand, when σ < ν+1, so that firms enjoy strong
market power and economies of scale are significant, M is decreasing in aggregate employment
because the effect at the firm level dominates. Given that empirical studies typically yield
estimates for σ above 2 and for ν in the interval (0, 1), we restrict our attention to cases where
σ > ν+1.24 In this case, the LMCs define upward-sloping loci because employment is increasing
in θ so that labor market clearing requires the mass of producer to be larger.
24Egger and Kreickemeier (2007) also impose a similar restriction in order to ensure that their equilibrium is
stable. Note that the condition σ < ν + 1 implies that the elasticity of aggregate productivity Φ with respect to
input diversity M is smaller than unity.
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5.2 Trade and unemployment without external economies of scale
In the absence of external economies of scale, i.e. when ν = 0, average and aggregate productiv-
ity coincide since input diversity drops out from the description of the labor market equilibrium.
It is therefore sufficient to see how average productivity, ϕ˜, changes in our globalization sce-
narios. Trade affects the distribution of productivities across intermediate input producers by
reallocating labor towards exporters and away from purely domestic firms, both at the exten-
sive and at the intensive margin. The effect of trade liberalization on average productivity is
nevertheless ambiguous because ϕ˜ factors in the output loss in export transit.
Part (i) of the following proposition gives a sufficient condition under which some liberaliza-
tion scenarios always lead to an increase in aggregate employment. Part (ii) derives necessary
and sufficient conditions for the case where the productivity distribution G (ϕ) belongs to the
Pareto family of distributions, as usually done in the literature on heterogeneous firms.25
Proposition 3 Assume that there are no economies of scale (ν = 0) and that the conditions
stated in Propositions 1 and 2 are met.
(i) If fX ≥ fD, a reduction of variable trade costs τ or an increase in the number of trading
partners n lead to a fall in the equilibrium rate of unemployment and a rise in the real wage,
regardless of whether wages are bargained individually or collectively. A fall in fixed foreign
distribution costs has an ambiguous effect on labor market outcomes.
(ii) Let firms draw their productivities from a Pareto distribution with dispersion parameter γ
such that γ > σ − 1. Then, regardless of the wage bargaining regime, the equilibrium rate of
unemployment falls and the real wage rises
(a) due to a reduction in τ or an increase in n if and only if σ−1γ
(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)
≥
fD
fX
− 1,
(b) and due to a reduction in fX if and only if γ
2
(σ−1)2 ≥
fX
fX−fD
[
1 + nτ−γ
(
fD
fX
) γ
σ−1
]
.
The new insight in Melitz (2003) is that trade liberalization reallocates market shares towards
efficient firms. Exporters, however, also incur iceberg transport costs which have to be deducted
from the productivity gains at the factory gate. Whether or not trade liberalization enhances
average productivity depends on which of these two adjustments prevails.26 When fX > fD,
25See Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007; Bernard, Redding, Schott, 2007; Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple, 2004.
26Melitz (2003) briefly alludes to the ambiguity of the relationship between trade liberalization and ϕ˜ (see
footnote 26, page 1713). He also introduces a measure of productivity at the factory gate and shows that it is
always lower in autarky.
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revenues generated on each foreign market have to exceed domestic revenues. In other words,
the higher efficiency of exporting firms offsets both transport costs and the difference between
fX and fD. This is why the selection effect always dominates the losses in export transit. On
the other hand, when fX < fD, some of the transport costs are compensated by lower fixed costs
in foreign markets. Then the productivity gains at the factory gate due to trade liberalization
are not necessarily higher than the increase in export losses.
A reduction in fixed costs of export fX triggers similar adjustments than a decrease in τ : it
raises the domestic threshold ϕ∗D and lowers the export threshold ϕ
∗
X . Yet, it reallocates market
shares in a different way. Whereas a decrease in τ raises the combined market shares of firms that
already exported prior to liberalization, a decrease in fX only benefits new exporters which are,
on average, less productive than existing ones. Hence, the overall effect on average productivity
is ambiguous and depends on whether the new exporters are on average more productive than
the economy-wide average before the fall in fX .
The region where the relationship between trade openness and average productivity is neg-
ative depends on the other parameters of the model. It can be characterized when parametric
assumptions are imposed on the sampling distribution G(ϕ), as shown in part (ii) of Proposition
3 for cases where the sampling distribution is Pareto. Note that the effect of fX is non-linear,
since the stated parameter restrictions depends on fX − fD. If that difference is negative, a
reduction in fixed market access costs always lowers unemployment.
In section 6 we calibrate the model towards U.S. data. This allows to assess whether the
conditions required for a beneficial impact of trade liberalization on labor market outcomes
are likely to be met in reality or not. The calibration will also highlight the differences across
bargaining regimes.27
5.3 Equilibrium with external economies of scale
Labor market tightness, real wages and input diversity are determined jointly when there are
external economies of scale (ν > 0). Their equilibrium values follow from the Job Creation,
Wage Curve and Labor Market Clearing conditions, as defined in Sections 3 and 5.1. To clarify
27It is easy to show that – everything else equal – unemployment reacts more strongly to aggregate productivity
in the case of individual bargaining than in the case of collective bargaining when b = 0. When b > 0, the
comparison is ambiguous. Since the ceteris paribus assumption across the two scenarios is problematic (β measures
different effective bargaining power in each case), we compare scenarios in the quantitative exercise of section 6.
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the analysis, we combine the Job Creation and Wage Curve into one equation that we label
Equilibrium Tightness Condition (ETC). As the LMC, the ETC defines a mapping between
input diversity M and labor market tightness θ. We can then combine the LMC and the ETC
for each bargaining environment to pin down the equilibrium values of M and θ. Using (9) and
(10) for individual, (12) and (11) for collective bargaining, we obtain
ETCI :MI(θI) =
 c(1−β)(1−δ)
(
r+s
m(θI)
+ βθI
)
ϕ˜
(
σ−1
σ−β − b
)

σ−1
ν
(24)
ETCC :MC(θC) =

(
r+s
1−δ
)
c
m(θC)
ϕ˜
(
σ−1
σ − b− βσ θCm(θC)r+s
)

σ−1
ν
. (25)
The ETCs are upward-sloping in each bargaining regime because more input diversity raises
efficiency and thus compensates the increase in recruitment costs as θ goes up. Given that
the LMCs conditions are also increasing, equilibrium existence and uniqueness are not anymore
ensured but can be established imposing empirically reasonable restrictions.28
Lemma 3 When ν ≥ 0, equilibrium tightness and input diversity are pinned down by the system
{(22), (24)} for the case of individual bargaining and by {(23), (25)} for the case of collective
bargaining. Assume that the aggregate matching function is Cobb-Douglas, so that m(θ) =
m0θ
−α, with m0 > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). In case of individual bargaining, a sufficient condition for
equilibrium existence and uniqueness is ν/ (σ − 1) < α. For the collective bargaining scenario,
a sufficient condition is ν/ (σ − 1) < min [α, 12 ].
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium conditions for the case of individual bargaining when wages
are bargained at the individual level. Under the parameter restrictions presented in Lemma 3,
both the ETC and the LMC start in the origin. The ETC is strictly convex while the LMC is
strictly concave over the relevant parameter ranges. The LMC converges to some upper bound
on input diversity M¯ while the ETC diverges. The collective bargaining case looks almost
identical.29 Hence, the existence of a unique equilibrium (point E) is guaranteed. As ν → 0,
28As explained in subsection 5.1, when σ < ν+1, the LMCs conditions are decreasing in θ. Hence, there always
exists a unique equilibrium when this parameter restriction is satisfied. Yet, we do not focus on this case because
it is neither theoretically realistic nor empirically relevant.
29 The only difference is that the ETCC locus asymptotes towards some tightness θ¯ > 0 implicitly determined
by β
σ
θ¯m(θ¯)
r+s
= σ−1
σ
− b > 0.
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Figure 3: Determination of input diversity and labor market tightness in general equilibrium
with ν > 0.
the ETC locus converges towards a vertical line, whose position is pinned down by average
productivity ϕ˜ and labor market variables.30
The parameter restriction stated in Lemma 3 requires that the strength of the external scale
effect is sufficiently low when compared to the elasticity of the matching function α. Empirically,
sectoral estimates of ν and α cluster around 0.5,31 hence σ would need to be above 2. This
requirement does not seem implausible empirically.
Only if ν > 0 do changes in labor market parameters affect aggregate productivity Φ. Average
productivity of input producer, however, remains unchanged, as Lemma 1 still applies. Hence,
labor market institutions matter for aggregate productivity only through their effect on input
diversity. Inspection of the equilibrium conditions reveals that higher levels of b or c rotate the
ETC loci upwards, while they do not affect the LMC curves. In both bargaining regimes, those
changes lower labor market tightness, real wages, and increase unemployment. In contrast, an
30When the flow-value of non market activity is not indexed to aggregate productivity but instead equal to
an exogenous constant, the ETC locus has a positive intercept on the vertical axis. As can easily be seen from
Figure 3, this implies that the model admits at least two equilibria or none. This explains why we have assumed
from the outset that non market activity yields revenues proportional to Φ. Janiak (2006) considers instead that
they are purely exogenous and so, in order to circumvent the multiplicity issue, focuses on cases where σ < ν+1.
This is why he finds a negative relationship between variable trade cost reduction and employment.
31See Ardelean (2007) for estimates of the external scale effect and Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001) for estimates
of the matching function parameters.
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improvement in the matching efficiency m0 affects the ETC and the LMC curves. The LMC
loci rotate upwards, while the ETC curves move in opposite direction: equilibrium tightness
unambiguously increases, leading to higher real wages and lower unemployment.
To sum up, labor market parameters have a qualitatively similar impact on unemployment
than in the standard Pissarides (2000) model with homogeneous firms and perfect competition
on product markets. Notice also that economies of scale generate a negative relationship between
the size of the economy, L, and the rate of unemployment. Given that such a correlation is not
substantiated by the data, the model suggests that the marginal scale effect has to be small,
either because of a low value of ν or a very high degree of input diversity.
5.4 Trade liberalization and unemployment with external economies of scale
We are now able to characterize the effect of trade liberalization on labor market outcomes
when the production function exhibits economies of scale. This is done in the next proposition,
which – as Proposition 3 – falls in two parts. Part (i) provides a sufficient condition for some
trade liberalization scenarios to improve labor market outcomes.32 It does not impose any
specific assumption on the productivity distribution. Conversely, part (ii) assumes that the
productivity distribution is Pareto and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for trade to
reduce the unemployment rate.
Proposition 4 Assume that there are economies of scale (ν > 0) and that the existence and
uniqueness condition in Lemma 3 is satisfied ( ν/ (σ − 1) < α).
(i) If fX ≥ fD a reduction of variable trade costs τ or an increase in the number of trading
partners n lead to a fall in the equilibrium rate of unemployment and a rise in the real wage,
regardless of whether wages are bargained individually or collectively. A fall in fixed foreign
distribution costs has an ambiguous effect on labor market outcomes.
(ii) Let firms draw their productivities from a Pareto distribution. Then, regardless of the wage
bargaining regime, the equilibrium rate of unemployment falls and the real wage rises
(a) due to a reduction in τ or an increase in n if and only if σ−1(1−ν)γ
(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)
≥
fD
fX
− 1,
(b) due to a reduction in fX if and only if
γ2(1−ν)
(σ−1)((σ−1)−νγ) ≥ fXfX−fD
[
1 + nτ−γ
(
fD
fX
) γ
σ−1
]
.
32Baldwin and Forslid (2006) provide conditions for different globalization scenarios to improve average pro-
ductivity in a Melitz model with ν = 1 and ϕ following the Pareto distribution.
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Proposition 4 generalizes Proposition 3 to cases with external economies of scale, as long
as the additional parameter restriction ensuring existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is
satisfied. As discussed before and illustrated by our numerical exercise below, the requirements
in Proposition 4 are largely satisfied by empirically reasonable parameter values. Accordingly,
our theoretical analysis leads us to the conclusion that trade openness is likely to have a beneficial
impact on labor market outcomes.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 derives sufficient and necessary conditions under the Pareto as-
sumption. Inspection of condition (a) shows that the higher economies of scale are, the more
likely it is that labor market outcomes are improved by a reduction in export tariffs or an increase
in the number of trading partners. Accordingly, when economies of scale are maximal (ν = 1),
as in Melitz (2003), condition (a) is always satisfied. The influence of ν is rather intuitive: trade
raises not only productivity at the factory gate but also input diversity and this second effect is
obviously more beneficial when economies of scales are strong.
Figure 3 illustrates our findings: when ϕ goes up, the ETC locus rotates downwards; the
effect on the LMC curve, however, depends on parameters. Nevertheless, even when the LMC
locus rotates down, the net effect on θ is positive in both wage bargaining scenarios. The effect
on input diversity, in contrast, remains ambiguous.
6 Numerical Illustration
Although our theoretical model can be fully characterized analytically, the effect of trade lib-
eralization on labor market outcomes is potentially ambiguous, a beneficial effect requiring
specific restrictions on exogenous parameters. We therefore calibrate the model in order to
assess whether those restrictions are likely to hold in reality. We simulate the labor market
effects of different trade liberalization scenarios to shed light on the quantitative importance
of the trade-unemployment nexus. The simulation also shows how the impact of liberalization
depends on the nature of the bargaining regime and on the strength of external economies of
scale. Clearly, our numerical exercise is merely illustrative since we model a world of perfectly
symmetric countries. Also note that we focus on the long-run and neglect adjustment dynamics
in the two state variables of the model, θ and ϕ˜.
Our calibration follows standard practice, as versions of the Melitz (2003) and of the Pis-
sarides search-matching model have been frequently calibrated in the literature. Regarding the
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product market, we follow Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007); calibration of the labor market
side is close to Shimer (2005).33
6.1 Calibration
In the following, we describe the calibration of our model. Table 1 summarizes all parameter
values and statistics are for monthly values.
Sampling distribution and aggregate production function. As Bernard et al. (2007),
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) or Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004), we assume that firm produc-
tivities are distributed according to a Pareto distribution. Setting the scale parameter of that
distribution to unity, the probability density is g (ϕ) = γϕ−(1+γ). The shape parameter γ governs
the rate of decay of the distribution. We need to impose γ > σ − 1 to ensure that the variance
of the sales distribution is finite. As Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), we set γ = 3.4 and
choose σ = 3.8. Ardelean (2007) estimates the ‘love for variety’ parameter ν for different U.S.
industries. Taking the average, we set ν = 0.41 in our baseline calibration.34
Variable and fixed costs of trade and entry. We set the number of potential workers
equal to L = 142 Mio. which matches the American labor force in 2000. We choose variable
trade costs τ equal to 1.3 as Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Given the Pareto distribution, the share
of firms that export is given by
% = τ−γ
(
fD
fX
) γ
1−σ
.
That number is put at about 21% by Bernard et al. (2003). Together with τ = 1.3, this pins
down the ratio fX/fD at about 1.7. Setting the number of trading partners n = 2, we obtain
an overall degree of openness (export sales over total sales) of about 19%. Finally, we calibrate
FE = 4125 and fD = 22.5 such that the equilibrium labor market tightness produced by our
model is 0.5 (Hall, 2005) and the average firm size is equal to 19 (Axtell, 2001).35
33See Felbermayr and Prat (2007) for a related calibration exercise for the case of a closed economy.
34See Table 1 in Ardelean (2007). We have chosen to use the simple mean value of ν for the U.S. in our
benchmark calibration. We do not use Ardelean’s estimate of σ since she identifies this parameter under the
assumption of homogeneous firms.
35The relation between FE and fD is of the same order of magnitude than in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
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Separation shocks. Job separations occur either because a firm exit the market or because
the match itself is destroyed. Bartelsmann et al. (2004) estimates are centered around a monthly
hazard rate of exiting the market δ = 0.96%. Match-specific shocks account for the job separa-
tions that are left unexplained by firm-specific shocks. Shimer (2005) estimates the monthly job
separation rate to be on average equal to s = 0.034. It follows that the monthly Poisson arrival
rate of match-specific shocks χ = s−δ1−δ ≈ 0.024.
Parameters for the matching function and cost of vacancy-posting. We postulate a
Cobb-Douglas matching function m(θ) = m0θ−α, whose elasticity α is set equal to 0.5 following
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The assumption of constant returns to matching implies that
θ is equal to the job finding rate m(θ)θ over the job filling rate m(θ). Shimer (2005) estimates
the monthly job finding rate in the U.S. to be around 0.45, whereas Hall (2005) finds an average
labor market tightness θ of around 0.5. It follows that the monthly job filling rate m(θ) is equal
to 0.45/0.5 ≈ 0.9, so that m0 ≈ 0.64. We target the flow income of unemployment to be 40%
of the equilibrium real wage, which yields a value for b of around 0.3.36 Firms’ vacancy posting
costs are fixed to 1.1 times the monthly wage (Ebell and Haefke, 2006). We calibrate those costs
at 40.98, which appears large compared to flow fixed costs. Note, however, that the equivalent
monthly flow cost is just 1.69.
Bargaining power and value of non-market activity. The results of Abowd and Allain
(1996) suggest that, in the case of individual bargaining, workers’ bargaining power is close to
βI = 0.5. However, when wages are collectively bargained, β plays a different role as the effective
bargaining power of workers (taking into account the outside option) is much larger. Cahuc et
al. (2002) have estimated trade unions’ bargaining power at French firms and suggest βC = 0.2.
Our choice of β for the different bargaining regimes yields equilibrium unemployment rates that
are reasonable enough: 7% for the case of individual bargaining and 11% for collective bargain-
ing. Notice that wages are approximately equal in both benchmark scenarios which allow us to
leave the other parameters unchanged without loss of generality.
36Recall that we have made the value of unemployment proportional to aggregate productivity.
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Table 1: Calibration-Parameter Values
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
External parameter estimates
L Labor endowment per country 142 Mio. American labor force
βI Bargaining power, individual bargaining 0.5 Abowd and Allain (1996)
βC Bargaining power, collective bargaining 0.2 Cahuc et al. (2002)]
α Elasticity of matching function 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
s Monthly job destruction 3.4% Shimer (2005)
r Monthly discount rate 0.33% 4% annual interest rate
δ Monthly rate of firm exit 0.97% Bartelsmann et al. (2004)
σ Elasticity of substitution 3.8 Bernard et al. (2007)
γ Decay of productivity distribution 3.4 Bernard et al. (2007)
ν Degree of external economies of scale 0.41 Ardelean (2007)
τ Iceberg trade costs 1.3 Ghironi & Melitz (2005)
Parameters matched to moments in the data
b Value of non-market activity 0.32 40% effective replacement rate
m0 Scale of matching function 0.64 Monthly job finding rate=0.45
c Cost of posting a vacancy 40.98 1.1 times monthly wage
(Ebell and Haefke, 2006)
fE Entry costs 4125 θ ≈ 0.5 (Hall, 2005)
fD Domestic flow fixed costs 22.5 Average firm size = 19
(Axtell, 2001)
fX Fixed foreign market access costs 38.25 % = 0.21 (Bernard et al., 2003)
Normalized Parameters
P Aggregate price level 1
n+ 1 Number of countries 3
Note: All parameter values and statistics are for monthly time periods and are calibrated towards the U.S.
economy.
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6.2 The labor market effects of trade liberalization
The calibrated parameters summarized in Table 1 show that the necessary condition, fX/fD > 1,
for lower variable trade costs to reduce unemployment is very likely to be met. Foreign relative
to domestic distribution costs need to be large for the model to be consistent with observed
low export participation rates of firms. Moreover, the sufficient and necessary condition for
foreign market access costs is met in the neighborhood of the calibrated value of fX .37 Hence,
from Table 1 it is possible to conclude that all three trade liberalization scenarios lead to lower
equilibrium unemployment and higher real wages, regardless of the bargaining environment.
By simulating the model, we can go beyond these findings. First, while the theoretical
analysis is local, our numerical exercise allows for a global analysis; this is particularly relevant
for fixed costs of accessing foreign markets as they have highly non-linear effect. Second, by
means of simulation we can quantify the unemployment-reducing effect of trade liberalization
and compare it across our two bargaining scenarios. Finally, the simulation makes it possible to
check the importance of the external economies of scale parameter ν.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of trade liberalization on labor market outcomes. The first row
of the panel studies variations in variable trade costs (τ) , the second in the number of countries
to which any country may export (n) , and the third row shows the effects of changing fixed costs
of foreign market access. For each scenario, we report the case of individual bargaining in the
left graph, and of collective bargaining in the right graph. All pictures have the real wage W on
the right ordinate and the unemployment rate U (in percent) on the left ordinate. Obviously,
the intersection of the W and the U curves has no particular meaning. The baseline calibration
at τ = 1.3, n = 2, fX = 38.25 shows an unemployment rate of 7% and a wage rate of 37.1 in the
case of individual bargaining. For collective bargaining, labor market distortions are stronger,
so that the unemployment rate is higher (10.9%) and the real wage slightly lower (36.9).
The first row of Figure 4 illustrates that lower variable trade costs τ can have a sizable effect
on labor market outcomes. In the case of individual bargaining, moving τ from 1.6 to 1 lowers
the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point from 7.4% to 6.4% and increases the wage rate
by 35.3% from 33.4 to 45.2. In the case of collective bargaining, unemployment falls by 0.1
percentage points from 11% to 10.9% while the wage rate goes up by 35.2% from 33.2 to 44.9.
Hence, while the nature of the bargaining regime does not matter for the qualitative implications
37Moreover, the values of ν, σ, and α provided by the empirical literature suggest that the existence and
uniqueness requirement of Lemma 3 is fairly weak.
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Figure 4: Simulation results: labor market effects of different trade liberalization scenarios.
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of trade reform, the quantitative effects are drastically different. With individual bargaining,
the reduction of the unemployment rate is much more pronounced, despite its lower initial level.
Interestingly, the real wage goes up almost as strongly as with collective bargaining.38
Figure 5 in the Appendix illustrates the product market effects of trade liberalization in
analogy to Figure 4. Strikingly, trade liberalization reduces input diversity while it boosts the
productivity of the average firm. This is the anti-variety effect described in Baldwin and Forslid
(2006). Given that we set external economies of scale at a lower level than in the literature
(ν = 0.41 versus 1.00), trade liberalization has a stronger effect on aggregate productivity Φ
and, hence, unemployment.
The second row in Figure 4 relates to variation in the number of export markets. In the
baseline case we have n = 2. Now, consider an increase of n to, say, 4. In the case of individual
bargaining, the wage rate goes up to about 42 while the unemployment rate falls to 6.6%.
As with variation in τ, any change in n has stronger unemployment effects with individual as
compared to collective bargaining.
Finally, consider the case of a change in the fixed foreign market access cost fX . A marginal
reduction in fX at the baseline equilibrium (fX = 38.25) leads to a reduction in the unem-
ployment rate and to an increase in the real wage. Lowering fX below about 70 reverts the
result: now, trade liberalization turns out to deteriorate labor market outcomes. The logic for
this result becomes transparent in Figure 4 in the Appendix. When fX falls, input diversity
goes up, but average productivity (ϕ˜) falls if fX dips below some threshold. The latter effect is
due to a weaker selection effect: lower fX reduces the prices charged by incumbent exporters,
but also allows less efficient firms to export. The net effect is ambiguous ex ante, and becomes
negative if fX is low enough. The case of collective bargaining is similar, with the variation in
the unemployment rate generally smaller than with individual bargaining. Note that doubling
fX from its baseline value increases unemployment only by 0.06 percentage points. The increase
in τ required to generate the same unemployment effect is just 0.03 (from 1.3 to 1.33). Hence,
lower variable trade costs appear to have a much stronger impact on labor market outcomes
than lower fixed market access costs.
Table 2 explores the importance of the external scale parameter ν. Holding everything else
38The discussed reduction of τ from 1.6 to 1 describes the entirely unrealistic transition from costly trade to a
situation where no trade-costs whatsoever exist. Since higher τ lowers the effective labor productivity, reducing
τ by 60% has a massive effect on aggregate productivity. With n growing towards infinity, the share of imported
inputs converges towards 1 and a reduction in τ is equivalent to an increase in the marginal productivity of labor.
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Individual bargaining
τ = 1.0 τ = 1.1 τ = 1.2 τ = 1.3 τ = 1.4 τ = 1.5 τ = 1.6
ν = 0.49 u 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3
w 88.5 81.6 76.5 72.5 69.5 67.1 65.3
ν = 0.45 u 5.4 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3
w 62.9 58.1 54.4 51.6 49.4 47.8 46.5
ν = 0.41 u 6.4 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.4
w 45.2 41.7 39.1 37.1 35.6 34.4 33.4
ν = 0.37 u 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.7
w 32.8 30.3 28.4 26.9 25.8 25.0 24.3
ν = 0.33 u 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.8 9.9 10.1
w 24.0 22.2 20.8 19.8 18.9 18.3 17.8
Collective bargaining
τ = 1.0 τ = 1.1 τ = 1.2 τ = 1.3 τ = 1.4 τ = 1.5 τ = 1.6
ν = 0.49 u 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
w 88.6 81.8 76.7 72.7 69.7 67.4 65.5
ν = 0.45 u 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
w 62.8 58.0 54.3 51.5 49.4 47.7 46.4
ν = 0.41 u 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.0
w 44.9 41.5 38.9 36.9 35.3 34.1 33.2
ν = 0.37 u 11.0 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.2
w 32.4 29.9 28.0 26.6 25.5 24.6 24.0
ν = 0.33 u 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.5
w 23.6 21.8 20.4 19.3 18.5 17.9 17.4
The combination τ = 1.3, ν = 0.41 represents our benchmark specification.
u is the unemployment rate, w is the real wage.
Table 2: Labor market effects of lower variable trade costs (τ) with various degrees of external
economies of scale (ν).
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equal, a higher value of ν (stronger scale effect) leads to lower unemployment, regardless of the
bargaining regime. Also, the extent to which trade liberalization reduces the equilibrium rate
of unemployment depends on the value of ν. The quantitative importance of increased input
diversity is massive: as ν moves up from its individual bargaining benchmark level ν = 0.41 to
0.49, the rate of unemployment decreases by about 2 percentage points; when ν falls by the same
amount, unemployment goes up even more strongly. Similarly, the real wage reacts strongly, too.
In the case of collective bargaining, the effect of ν on the unemployment rate is comparatively
small: This is due to the fact that variation in ν mainly affects the wage rate. Table 3 in the
Appendix reports the effects of lower fX on labor market outcomes with different ν. Compared
with the baseline case, higher ν increases the sensitivity of both the unemployment rate and the
wage as fX changes.
Corsetti et al. (2007) discuss the importance of ‘love for variety’ in an open-macro model
with homogeneous firms. They find that the welfare properties of their model crucially depends
on ν. Our results confirm this finding in the context of search unemployment, heterogeneous
firms, and trade.
7 Conclusion
Bringing together two important established but hitherto unrelated models in the trade and labor
literatures – the Melitz (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms, and the Pissarides (2000)
search and matching approach to unemployment – this paper develops conditions under which
the selection effect of trade improves labor market outcomes. While there is strong empirical
support in favor of turnover on labor markets and in line with the selection effect of trade, there
is much less consensus on how to model wage bargaining; hence, the present paper discusses two
environments, individual bargaining and collective firm-level bargaining.
The proposed framework is surprisingly tractable, in spite of the existence of heterogeneous
firms, various types of trade costs, monopoly power on product markets, and monopsony power
due to search frictions on the labor market. The equilibrium is recursive since labor market
conditions do not affect average productivity (the converse, of course, is not true). If the model
exhibits economies of scale, there is a wedge between average and aggregate productivity. Then,
aggregate productivity does depend on labor market outcomes.
The paper shows that the labor market implications of trade liberalization are determined
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by the effect of trade on aggregate productivity. This latter relation, however, depends on
parameter constellations. To sort out the ambiguities, we calibrate the model towards U.S.
data. We find that different trade liberalization scenarios all improve labor market outcomes,
regardless of the bargaining environment. Moreover, the reduction in the unemployment rate is
numerically non-trivial, in particular when wages are bargained individually and economies of
scale are important.
Compared to existing models that combine search unemployment and heterogeneous firms,
our treatment features forward-looking firms, micro-founds the wage determination, and allows
one to derive the main results without any assumptions on the distribution of firm productivities.
External economies of scale are shown to be important for the model’s properties. Existence
and uniqueness do not require strong assumptions on parameters, and the model is straight-
forwardly calibrated. There are, however, two obvious and interesting extensions which we have
to relegate to future research.
First, our approach focuses on long-run equilibria. This precludes the analysis of potentially
interesting short-run adjustments, which result from the fact that the mass of producers adjusts
only sluggishly to a changed environment due to sunk entry costs. Most empirical studies on
the interaction between trade liberalization and labor turnover capture short to medium-run
correlations, so that our model has little to say relative to their results. Moreover, any sensible
welfare analysis requires to weigh potential losses along the transition path against the positive
long-run effects.
Second, our conclusions are limited to the impact of multilateral trade liberalization amongst
symmetric countries. Hence, we cannot say much about the recent surge in bilateral trade
treaties or, even more importantly, about the effect on employment of trade liberalization with
emerging countries such as China or India. We therefore believe that the most promising di-
rection for further research would be to extend the model to cases where countries differ with
respect to sizes, productivity levels and institutions. This will probably be a rather demanding
project since addressing country asymmetries has proved difficult in the literature, in particular
if one is not willing to narrow the analysis to two countries or to allow for a nume´raire sector
whose output is costlessly tradable.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To solve the surplus-splitting rule (8), notice that the optimality condition
(5) does not vary with the level of the control variable vI . Hence, the optimal firm size remains constant
through time, so that lI = l′I . This condition and the envelope theorem enable us to rewrite (6) as
∂JI (lI , ϕ)
∂lI
=
(
1
r + s
)[
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
− wI (lI , ϕ)− ∂wI (lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI
]
.
Reinserting this expression together with EI (ϕ)− UI = (wI (lI , ϕ)− rUI)/(r + s) into (8) yields
wI (lI , ϕ) = β
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
+ (1− β)rUI − β ∂wI (lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI (26)
= β
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
YI
M
(1−ν)
I
(
1 + I(ϕ)nτ1−σ
)]1/σ
ϕ
σ−1
σ l
− 1σ
I + (1− β)rUI − β
∂wI (lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI .
Equation (26) is a linear differential equation in lI . One can verify by direct substitution39 that
wI (lI , ϕ) = (1− β)rUI + β
(
σ
σ − β
)
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
(27)
solves (26). Equation (27) is the counterpart of the Wage curve in the standard search-matching model.
The Job Creation curve is derived reinserting the demand function (2) into (27) and differentiating the
resulting equation with respect to lI
∂wI (lI , ϕ)
∂lI
lI = − 1
σ
[
β
(
σ
σ − β
)
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
]
.
This expression allows us to substitute (∂wI (lI , ϕ) /∂lI) lI in (7) to obtain
wI (lI , ϕ) =
(
σ
σ − β
)
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
−
(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m (θI)
. (28)
Finally, we express the Wage Curve as a function of θI by reinserting (27) into (28)
wI (lI , ϕ) = rUI +
(
β
1− β
)(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m(θI)
. (29)
It follows that wages are identical across firms. Thus the workers’ outside option reads
rUI(θI) = bΦI + θIm(θI)
(
wI − rUI
r + s
)
= bΦI +
β
1− β
(
cθI
1− δ
)
,
39See Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) or Ebell and Haefke (2006) for a detailed solution of a similar ODE
by the method of variation of parameters.
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where (29) is used to drop the dependence of wI on lI and ϕ. The Wage curve in Proposition 1 follows
after reinserting the expression of UI into (29). To simplify the Job Creation curve, consider first a firm
that does not export, so that I(ϕ) = 0. In this case, it is easily seen that the iso-elastic demand (2)
implies ∂R(lI ;ϕ)/∂lI = pD(lI ;ϕ)ϕ (σ − 1) /σ. This equality also holds true for exporting firms because
they are facing the same domestic demand than non-exporting firms and that marginal revenues are
equalized across markets. To see this formally, notice that
∂R(lI ;ϕ)
∂lI
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
YI
M
(1−ν)
I
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)]1/σ
ϕq(lI ;ϕ)−
1
σ
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
YI
M
(1−ν)
I
)1/σ
qD(lI ;ϕ)−
1
σ ϕ =
(
σ − 1
σ
)
pD(lI ;ϕ)ϕ , when I(ϕ) = 1.
The second equality holds true because output is optimally allocated across markets when qX = qDτ1−σ.
Equation (28) therefore implies that pD (ϕ)ϕ = pD (ϕ˜) ϕ˜ = Φ, where the last equality follows from the
definition of ϕ˜. These simplifications lead to the Job Creation condition reported in Proposition 1.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium is ensured since the Wage curve is increasing in θ and the Job
Creation curve decreasing. For the same reason, a necessary and sufficient condition for existence is that
the intercept of the Wage curve be smaller than that of the Job Creation curve, which yields the condition
stated in Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Combining the Job Creation and Wage curves in Proposition 1 leads to the
following equilibrium requirement
ΨI (θI ; ΦI) ≡ ΦI
(
b− σ − 1
σ − β
)
+
c
1− β
(
r + s
m(θI)(1− δ) +
βθI
1− δ
)
= 0 .
Differentiating ΨI (θI ; ΦI) with respect to ΦI and θI yields
∂θI
∂ΦI
= −∂ΨI (θI ; ΦI) /∂ΦI
∂ΨI (θI ; ΦI) /∂θI
= −
b− σ−1σ−β
c
1−β
(
− r+s1−δ m
′(θI)
m(θI)2
+ β1−δ
) > 0 ,
when the requirement for equilibrium existence b < σ−1σ−β is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. The contract curve is given by the points where the firm iso-profit curves
are tangent to the union’s indifference curves, so that
∂F(lC , wC ;ϕ)/∂lC
∂F(lC , wC ;ϕ)/∂wC
=
∂U(lC , wC ;ϕ)/∂lC
∂U(lC , wC ;ϕ)/∂wC
⇒ ∂R(lC ;ϕ)
∂lC
= rUC +
(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m(θC)
. (30)
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The actual contract solves the following Nash-bargaining problem 40
max
wC ,lC
Ω(wC , lC ;ϕ) ≡ U(lC , wC ;ϕ)βF(lC , wC ;ϕ)1−β . (31)
The union and the firm split the forward looking surplus.41 The first order condition with respect to the
wage rate is
wC(ϕ, lC) = (1− β) rUC + β
[
R(lC ;ϕ)
lC
−
(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m (θC)
]
= rUC +
(
β
σ
)
R(lC ;ϕ)
lC
, (32)
where the second equality is obtained substituting the Pareto optimality condition (30) and using the
identity ∂R(lC ;ϕ)/∂lC =
(
σ−1
σ
)
R(lC ;ϕ)/lC . Equation (32) is the Wage curve under collective bargain-
ing. The Job Creation curve is given by the first order condition of problem (31) with respect to the
employment level
wC (ϕ, lC) =
(
1− 1− β
σ
)
R(lC ;ϕ)
lC
−
(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m (θC)
. (33)
Both conditions indicate that wages are identical across firms since, as explained in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, R(lC ;ϕ)/lC = pD (ϕ)ϕ = pD (ϕ˜) ϕ˜ =M
ν
σ−1
C ϕ˜. The employees’ outside option therefore reads
rUC(θC) = b+ θCm(θC)
(
wC − rUC
r + s
)
= b+ θCm(θC)
(
β
σ(r + s)
)
ΦC , (34)
where the last equality follows from (32). Combining the three equations above, yields the expressions
in Proposition 2. The existence and uniqueness requirements follow from the same reasoning than in the
proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof is established in a similar fashion as Corollary 1. Combining the Job
Creation and Wage curves in Proposition 2 leads to the following equilibrium requirement
ΨC (θC ; ΦC) ≡ ΦC
(
b+
β
σ
(
θCm(θC) + r + s
r + s
)
+
−σ + 1− β
σ
)
+
(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m (θC)
= 0 .
Differentiating ΨC (θC ; ΦC) with respect to ΦC and θC yields
∂θC
∂ΦC
= −∂ΨC (θC ; ΦC) /∂ΦC
∂ΨC (θC ; ΦC) /∂θC
> 0
40The set-up cost F is sunk and so cannot be recovered by the firm in case of disagreement with the
union. Thus it does not enter the firm outside option. If one assume, as in Melitz (2003), that operating
costs are paid in each period, the strategic form of the Nash-bargaining problem still holds as long as the
firm cannot default on his payment following a breakdown in the wage negotiation. Notice, however, that
when fixed costs are included in the firm threat point, the solution to (31) does not lie on the contract
curve and so violates the axiom of Pareto optimality. Hence, our formulation can also be justified on
axiomatic ground.
41Considering instead that disagreement delays production does not fundamentally affect our result.
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The inequality sign follows from
∂ΨC (θC ; ΦC)
∂ΦC
= b+
β
σ
θCm(θC) + r + s
r + s
+
−σ + 1− β
σ
= − 1
ΦC
[(
r + s
1− δ
)
c
m (θC)
]
< 0 (35)
∂ΨC (θC ; ΦC)
∂θC
=
ΦCβ [θCm′(θC) +m(θC)]
σ(r + s)
−
(
r + s
1− δ
)
cm′(θC)
m(θC)2
> 0 (36)
The last equality follows from ΨC(θC ; ϕ˜C) = 0 and the sign of the inequality holds true due to the
homogeneity of degree one of the matching function.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first establish that the relationship between ϕ∗D and ϕ
∗
X does not depend on
θ. From the definition of the cutoff productivity in equation (15)
piX (ϕ∗X)+fX−
(
r + δ
1− δ
)
c
m (θ)
lX (ϕ∗X) = τ
1−σ
[
piD (ϕ∗X) + fD −
(
r + δ
1− δ
)
c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ∗X)
]
=
(
r + δ
1− δ
)
fX .
But we also know that employment levels are log-linear functions of ϕ, so that
piD (ϕ∗X) + fD −
(
r + δ
1− δ
)
c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ∗X) =
(
ϕ∗X
ϕ∗D
)σ−1 [
piD (ϕ∗D) + fD −
(
r + δ
1− δ
)
c
m (θ)
lD (ϕ∗D)
]
=
(
ϕ∗X
ϕ∗D
)σ−1(
r + δ
1− δ
)
fD ,
where the last equality follows from the definition of ϕ∗D. Combining the two relations above, yields the
same relationship than in Melitz (2003): ϕ∗X = τϕ
∗
D (fX/fD)
1
σ−1 . This equation allow us to use (19) to
pin down ϕ∗D. We can then use (14) to express ϕ˜k as a function of ϕ
∗
k, for k ∈ {D,X}.
Proof of Lemma 2. We derive the equilibrium mass of firms when wages are bargained at the individual
level. The average levels of employment follow from the requirement that the profits of ϕ∗D-firms be zero
lk(ϕ∗k)
[
(ΦC − w) 1− δ
r + δ
− c
m (θ)
r + s
r + δ
]
= fD
(
1 + r
r + δ
)
, for k ∈ {D,X},
and the log-linear relation between firm sizes: lk(ϕ˜) = (ϕ˜k/ϕ∗k)
σ−1
lk(ϕ∗k), for k ∈ {D;X}. Reinserting
the job creation curve yields
lk(ϕ˜k) =
(
ϕ˜k
ϕ∗k
)σ−1(1 + r
1− δ
)(
σ − β
1− β
)
fk
M
ν
σ−1 ϕ˜
, for k ∈ {D,X} .
Accordingly, equation (21) is equivalent to
MI,D = L
(
θm(θI)
s+ θm(θI)
)(
1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
1 + r
)[(
ϕ˜D
ϕ∗D
)σ−1(
fD
M
ν
σ−1
I ϕ˜
)
+ n%
(
ϕ˜X
ϕ∗X
)σ−1(
fX
M
ν
σ−1
I ϕ˜
)]−1
,
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Using the Free Entry condition (19), we can rearrange this expression as follows
MI,D =M
ν
σ−1
I ϕ˜L
(
θIm(θI)
s+ θIm(θI)
)(
1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
1 + r
)[(
r + δ
1 + r
)
fE
1−G(ϕ∗D)
+ fD + n%fX
]−1
.
In order to get the final solution for the number of available varieties, one has to takeMI = (1+n%)MI,D
into consideration, so that
MI = (1 + n%)M
ν
σ−1
I ϕ˜L
(
θIm(θI)
s+ θIm(θI)
)(
1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
r + s
)[(
r + δ
1 + r
)
fE
1−G(ϕ∗D)
+ fD + n%fX
]−1
=
(1 + n%)L( θIm(θI)
s+ θIm(θI)
)(
1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
r + s
) ϕ˜(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE
1−G(ϕ∗D) + fD + n%fX

1−σ
1−σ+ν
.
The solution in the case where wages are collectively bargaining is obtained following the same steps.
Proof of Proposition 3(i). The definition of ϕ˜ in equation (13) and the equilibrium condition (19)
imply that
ϕ˜ = ϕ∗D
{
1
1 + n%
[(
ϕ˜D
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
+ n%
fX
fD
(
ϕ˜X
ϕ∗X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
= ϕ∗D
 fE/fD1−G(ϕ∗D)
(
1+r
r+δ
)
+ 1 + n% fXfD
1 + n%

1
σ−1
.
(37)
As explained in Melitz, trade liberalization always raises ϕ∗D as it shifts up the Zero Cutoff Profit condition
but leaves the Free Entry condition unchanged. Hence ∂
(
1+n%
fX
fD
1+n%
)
/∂n ≥ 0 ⇒ ∂ϕ˜/∂n ≥ 0, which
obviously holds true when fX ≥ fD. A similar result can be derived for τ noticing that ∂%/∂τ < 0. On
the other hand, fX has two opposite effects: it reduces the share of exporting firms % and it increases
the ratio {fX/fD}. Thus, even when fX > fD, the effect of fX is a priori ambiguous. The effect of
trade liberalization on unemployment stated in Proposition 3(i) immediately follows from Corollaries 1
and 2 and the fact that, since (1− ν) = 1, M νσ−1 = 1 for all M > 0. Given that the Wage curve in both
bargaining regimes is increasing in θ, it also follows that real wages are increasing in n and τ .
Proof of Proposition 3(ii). Because there does not exist a general closed-form solution for ϕ∗D, we
have to impose a particular functional form on g(ϕ) in order to derive necessary conditions which are
functions of the exogenous parameters. We follow the common practice in the literature by considering
that g(ϕ) is Pareto, so that g(ϕ) = γϕ
(
ϕ¯
ϕ
)γ
. Since the absolute value of ϕ is meaningless in our model,
we can normalize ϕ¯ to one without loss of generality. Then it holds true that
ϕ˜D =
(
γ
1− σ + γ
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗D and ϕ˜X =
(
γ
1− σ + γ
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗X ,
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and ϕ˜ can be decomposed as follows
ϕ˜ =
[
1
1 + n%
(
ϕ˜σ−1D + n%τ
1−σϕ˜σ−1X
)] 1σ−1
=
(
γ
1− σ + γ
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗D
1 + n%
(
fX
fD
)
1 + n%

1
σ−1
. (38)
We can now use the equilibrium condition (19) to express ϕ∗D as a function of the parameters
ϕ∗D =
[(
1
fE
)(
1 + r
r + δ
){
fD
[(
ϕ˜D
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
+ n%fX
[(
ϕ˜X
ϕ∗X
)σ−1
− 1
]}] 1
γ
=
[(
fD
fE
)(
1 + r
r + δ
)(
γ
1− σ + γ − 1
)(
1 + n%
(
fX
fD
))] 1
γ
. (39)
Reinserting this expression into (38) and using the fact that % = τ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1 , we finally obtain
ϕ˜ = K0
(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ−σ+1
σ−1
) 1
σ−1+
1
γ
(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)− 1σ−1
, (40)
where
K0 ≡
(
γ
1− σ + γ
) 1
σ−1
[(
fD
fE
)(
1 + r
r + δ
)(
σ − 1
1− σ + γ
)] 1
γ
.
Differentiating this expression with respect to n shows that
∂ϕ˜
∂n
≥ 0⇔ σ − 1
γ
(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)
≥ fD
fX
− 1 .
Since fXτσ−1 > fD, it is easily seen that: σ−1γ (1 + n) ≤ fDfX − 1 ⇒ ∂ϕ˜/∂n < 0. This establishes that
the necessary condition above can be violated. The effects of τ is easily derived following similar steps.
Regarding the comparative static with respect to fX ,we have
∂ϕ˜
∂fX
≤ 0⇔
(
γ
σ − 1
)2
≥ fX
fX − fD
[
1 + nτ−γ
(
fX
fD
)− γσ−1]
Clearly, that inequality can hold only if fX > fD.
The impact on employment and real wages is obtained from the same reasoning than in the proof of
Proposition 3(i).
Proof of Lemma 3
Individual Bargaining. It is easily seen that, when σ + (1− ν) > 2, both (22) and (24) converge
to zero as θI goes to zero. When θI goes to infinity, (24) diverges to infinity whereas (22) converges to
M ≡
L(1 + n%)( 1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
r + s
) ϕ˜I(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE
1−G(ϕ∗D) + fD + n%fX

1−σ
1−σ+ν
<∞ .
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Hence, the existence of an equilibrium is established if the derivative of (24) at θI = 0 is inferior to that
of (22). Since
∂MI
∂θI
∣∣∣∣
ETCI
=
σ − 1
ν
K1
(
r + s+ βθIm(θI)
m(θI)
)σ−1
ν −1(α(r + s) + βθIm(θI)
θIm(θI)
)
,
with K1 ≡
[
c
(
(1− β)(1− δ)ϕ˜
(
σ−1
σ−β − b
))−1]σ−1ν
, the derivative of (22) w.r.t. θI converges to zero as
θI goes to zero if and only if: limθI→0 θIm(θI)
σ−1
ν = ∞. With the Cobb-Douglas specification, this
requirement is fulfilled when α > νσ−1 . Consider now the derivative of (22) w.r.t. θI
∂MI
∂θI
∣∣∣∣
LMCI
=
σ − 1
σ − 1− νK2
(
θIm(θI)
s+ θIm(θI)
) 1−σ
1−σ+ν−1
(
(1− α)m(θI)s
(s+ θIm(θI))
2
)
,
where
K2 ≡
L(1 + n%)( 1− β
σ − β
)(
1− δ
r + s
) ϕ˜(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE
1−G(ϕ∗D) + fD + n%fX

1−σ
1−σ+ν
.
Hence it diverges to infinity as θ goes to zero if and only if: limθ→0 θ
1−σ
1−σ+ν−1m(θ)
1−σ
1−σ+ν =∞. With the
Cobb-Douglas specification, this requirement is fulfilled when α > νσ−1 . Hence, equilibrium existence is
established.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the fact that (24) is convex while (22) is concave in
θI . Since
∂2MI
∂θ2I
∣∣∣∣
ETCI
= K1
(
σ − 1
ν
)
[Z1 − Z2] ,
where
Z1 =
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)(
(r + s)m−10 θ
α
I + βθI
)σ−1
ν −2 (α(r + s)m−10 θα−1I + β)2 , (41)
Z2 = (1− α)
(
(r + s)m−10 θ
α
I + βθI
)σ−1
ν −1 α(r + s)m−10 θ
α−2
I . (42)
The second derivative of (24) is positive when
Z1 > Z2 ⇔
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)(
α(r + s)m−10 θ
α−1
I + β
)2
> (1− α) ((r + s)m−10 θα + βθI)α(r + s)m−10 θα−2I .
But the term on the left-hand side of the inequality can be lower-bounded as follows(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)(
α(r + s)m−10 θ
α−1
I + β
)2
>
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)
α2
(
(r + s)m−10 θ
α−1
I + β
)2
>
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)
α
(
(r + s)m−10 θ
α
I + βθI
)
α(r + s)m−10 θ
α−2
I
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Thus (24) is convex when
(
σ−1
ν − 1
)
α > 1− α⇔ α > νσ−1 . Similarly differentiating twice (22) w.r.t. θI
yields
∂2MI
∂θ2I
∣∣∣∣
LMCI
=
K2
(1−σ)(1−α)
1−σ+ν s(
s+m0θ1−αI
)2( 1−σ1−σ+ν+1) [Z3 − Z4] ,
where
Z3 =
(
(1− σ)(1− α)
1− σ + ν − 1
)
m
1−σ
1−σ+ν
0 θ
(1−σ)(1−α)
1−σ+ν −2
I
(
s+m0θ1−αI
) 1−σ
1−σ+ν+1 , (43)
Z4 =
(
1− σ
1− σ + ν + 1
)
(1− α)m
1−σ
1−σ+ν+1
0 θ
(1−σ)(1−α)
1−σ+ν −α−1
I
(
s+m0θ1−αI
) 1−σ
1−σ+ν , (44)
which is negative when (1−σ)(1−α)1−σ+ν < 1⇔ α > νσ−1 .
Collective Bargaining. The ETCC is well defined only if
σ − 1
σ
− b > βσ θCm(θC)r+s ⇔ σ−1σ − b = Υβσ θCm(θC)r+s , (45)
which makes sure that the equilibrium mass is real-valued and from where it follows that Υ > 1. This
restriction allows to find a sufficient condition for the strict convexity of ETCC , very much in line with
the proof for Individual bargaining.
It is easily seen that (22) and (24) converge to zero as θ goes to zero. When θ goes to the upper bound
θ¯C , (25) diverges to infinity whereas (23) converges to some M¯C < ∞. Under collective bargaining the
first derivative of the ETCC with respect to θC is
∂MC
∂θC
∣∣∣∣
ETCC
=
σ − 1
ν
[(
r+s
1−δ
)
c
m0
]σ−1
ν
(Z5 + Z6)
ϕ˜
σ−1
ν
(
σ−1
σ − b− βσ
m0θ
1−α
C
r+s
)σ−1
ν +1
where
Z5 =
{
α
[(
σ − 1
σ
− b
)
θ
ασ−1ν −1
C −
β
σ
m0
r + s
θ
α(σ−1ν −1)
C
]}
,
Z6 =
{
(1− α) β
σ
m0
r + s
θ
α(σ−1ν −1)
C
}
,
which converges to zero if θ goes to zero if α > νσ−1 . The slope of LMCC in θC depends on the same
conditions than LMCI . The LMCC is strictly concave (the proof is identical to the case of individual
bargaining). The strict convexity of ETCC requires
∂2MC
∂θ2C
∣∣∣∣
ETCC
=
σ − 1
ν
1
ϕ˜
σ−1
ν
[(
r+s
1−δ
)
c
m0
]σ−1
ν {(Z ′5 + Z ′6)Z7 − (Z5 + Z6)Z ′7}
Z27
> 0 (46)
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where Z7 =
(
σ−1
σ − b− βσ
m0θ
1−α
C
r+s
)σ−1
ν +1
and
Z ′5 =
{
α
[(
α
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)(
σ − 1
σ
− b
)
θ
ασ−1ν −2
C −
(
α
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
))
β
σ
m0
r + s
θ
α(σ−1ν −1)−1
C
]}
,
Z ′6 =
{
(1− α)α
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)
β
σ
m0
r + s
θ
α(σ−1ν −1)−1
C
}
,
Z ′7 = −(1− α)
(
σ − 1
ν
+ 1
)(
σ − 1
σ
− b− β
σ
m0θ
1−α
C
r + s
)σ−1
ν
(
β
σ
m0θ
−α
C
r + s
)
.
The second derivative is positive when Z ′5 + Z
′
6 is positive which holds if
α
(
α
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)(
σ − 1
σ
− b
)
θ
ασ−1ν −1
C + (1− 2α)
(
α
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
))
β
σ
m0
r + s
θ
α(σ−1ν −1)
C > 0 .
which is positive if α > νσ−1 and σ > 2. This condition can be lower bounded using (45). Thus we know
that the second derivative is positive as long as the following condition holds
α
(
α
σ − 1
ν
− 1
)
Υ+ (1− 2α)
(
α
(
σ − 1
ν
− 1
))
> 0 (47)
Let Υ→ 1, then (σ − 1)/ν > 2 secures that the the second derivative is positive. Hence, the equilibrium
is unique if νσ−1 < min [α,
1
2 ].
Proof of Proposition 4(i) Interacting equations (24) and (22), and the proof in Lemma 3 that (24)
intersects (22) from below, it can be seen that
sign
{
∂θ
∂n
}
= sign

∂
[
ϕ˜
(σ−1)2
(σ−1−ν)ν (1 + n%)
1−σ
1−σ+ν
[(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE/fD
1−G(ϕ∗D) + 1 + n%(fX/fD)
] σ−1
1−σ+ν
]
∂n
 .
According to the definition of ϕ˜ in (37), the term on the right-hand side reads
ϕ˜
(σ−1)2
(σ−1−ν)ν
 1 + n%(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE/fD
1−G(ϕ∗D) + 1 + n%(fX/fD)

1−σ
1−σ+ν
= ϕ∗D
λ1

(
r+δ
1+r
)
fE/fD
1−G(ϕ∗D) + 1 + n%(fX/fD)
1 + n%
λ2 ,
(48)
where
λ1 =
(σ − 1)2
ν(σ − 1− ν) > 0 and λ2 =
(1− ν) (σ − 1)
ν(σ − 1− ν) > 0 .
We know from Melitz (2003) that ϕ∗D is increasing in n. Hence, the number of trading partners unam-
biguously raises the vacancy-unemployment ratio when fx > fD. As before, a similar prediction can be
derived for τ noticing that ∂%/∂τ < 0, whereas the effect of fX is a priori ambiguous.
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Proof of Proposition 4(ii) When firms draw their productivities from a Pareto distribution, we can
use (39) to substitute ϕ∗D in condition (48). Since % can be replaced by τ
−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1 , we obtain
sign
{
∂θ
∂n
}
= sign

∂
[(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)−λ2 (
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ−σ+1
σ−1
)λ2+λ1/γ]
∂n
 .
Differentiating this expression with respect to n shows that
∂θ
∂n
≥ 0⇔
(
σ − 1
γ (1− ν)
)(
1 + nτ−γ(fD/fX)
γ
σ−1
)
≥ fD
fX
− 1 .
Obviously, this condition is always satisfied when (1− ν) = 0, as in Melitz (2003). A similar result follows
for τ . An increase in foreign beachhead costs leads to a decreasing average productivity if the following
requirement is fulfilled
∂θ
∂fX
≤ 0⇔ γ
2(1− ν)
(σ − 1) ((σ − 1)− νγ) ≥
fX
fX − fD
[
1 + nτ−γ
(
fD
fX
) γ
σ−1
]
B Additional simulation results
Individual bargaining Collective bargaining
fX 22.5 38.25 65.025 114.75 22.5 38.25 65.025 114.75
ν = 0.49 u 5.13 5.07 5.05 5.07 10.70 10.70 10.70 10.69
w 70.69 72.48 73.01 72.61 70.90 72.69 73.22 72.82
ν = 0.45 u 6.08 6.00 5.97 5.98 10.81 10.80 10.80 10.80
w 50.14 51.56 52.04 51.80 50.09 51.51 51.98 51.74
ν = 0.41 u 7.16 7.05 7.01 7.03 10.96 10.94 10.94 10.94
w 35.95 37.08 37.48 37.34 35.73 36.85 37.25 37.11
ν = 0.37 u 8.38 8.24 8.19 8.20 11.16 11.14 11.13 11.13
w 26.03 26.93 27.27 27.19 25.70 26.58 26.92 26.85
ν = 0.33 u 9.76 9.59 9.52 9.53 11.43 11.39 11.38 11.38
w 19.04 19.75 20.03 20.00 18.62 19.32 19.60 19.56
The combination fX = 38.25, ν = 0.41 represents our benchmark specification.
u is the unemployment rate, w is the real wage.
Table 3: Labor market effects of export fixed costs with various degrees of external economies
of scale.
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Figure 5: Simulation results: Product market effects of different trade liberalization scenarios
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